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|  | **Purpose** | **Citation** | **What defeat in Province A means** | **Response to defeat** | **Target of response** |
| Platform/power-sharing | For opposition to compete non-violently | A&R (2005)  Cox (2008) | Not relevant (power-sharing is working) | No reaction | N/A |
|  | For elites to contest over patronage | Lust-Okar (2006) | Not relevant (power-sharing is working) | No reaction | N/A |
| Information | General regime popularity | Miller (2012, 2013, 2015) | Regime is generally unpopular | Policy change – pork, redistribution etc. in the whole country | National level i.e. no difference across provinces |
|  | General opposition strength or popularity | Geddes (2006) | Opposition is generally strong (not relevant in VN) |  |  |
|  | **Geographic distribution of support** | **Magaloni (2006)**  **Blaydes (2008)** | **Opposition is strong in  Province A** | **Policy change – pork, redistribution etc. in Province A only**  **Improve electioneering** | **Provincial level** |
|  | **Loyalty or competence of local bureaucrats** | **Blaydes (2008)**  **Magaloni (2006)** | **Bureaucrats in Province A is disloyal/incompetent** | **Punish – reduce opportunity to seek rent**  **Punish – demotion/deny promotion** | **Individual level – provincial leaders** |
|  | Popularity of party candidates |  | Central candidates running in Province A is weak | Punish – demotion/deny  promotion | Individual level – candidates |
| Co-optation | Divide opposition, co-opt into regime | Lust-Okar (2005) | Local candidates running in Province A is strong | Co-opt – promotion | Individual level – candidates |
| Demonstration | Show of strength | Geddes (2006)  Magaloni (2006)  Simpser (2008) | Regime is exposed as “weak” | Policy change – pork, redistribution etc  Increased propaganda  Improve electioneering | National level i.e. no difference across provinces |

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| **Outcome variable** | **Target of change** | **Direction** |  | **Implied purpose of election** |  |
| Pork/transfer | National | Increase | +B1  +D1 | Information – General popularity  Tool of rule – Show of strength |  |
|  | National | Decrease | -B1  -D1 |  |  |
|  | Provincial only | Increase[[1]](#footnote-2) | +B3  -B4 | Information – Distribution of bases of support and opposition strongholds | i.e. defeat provides info about the province |
|  | Provincial only | Decrease | +B4  -B3 | Information – Loyalty or competence of subordinates – local bureaucrats | i.e. defeat provides info about the local leader |
| Promotion | Local leader | Promotion | -B4 |  |  |
|  |  | Demotion/stalled | +B4 | Information – Loyalty or competence of subordinates – local bureaucrats |  |
|  | Central candidate | Promotion | -B5 |  |  |
|  |  | Demotion/stalled | +B5 | Information – Popularity of individual subordinates – candidates | i.e. defeat provides info about the defeated central candidate(s) |
|  | Local candidate | Promotion | +C1 | Divide opposition, co-opt into regime | i.e. defeat provides info about the victorious local candidate(s) |
|  |  | Demotion/stalled | -C1 |  |  |
| Electioneering | Provincial | More | +B3  +D1 | Information – Distribution of bases of support and opposition strongholds  Show of strength |  |
|  |  | Less | -B3  -D1 |  |  |
| No change |  |  | +A1  +A2 |  |  |

1. May consider balance between transfer that benefits the whole population vs. transfer that benefits only the leader [↑](#footnote-ref-2)